

**Post-Election Manual Audit Pilot
Summary Information / Preliminary Report**

Franklin County, Ohio

Election Date: March 4, 2008

What follows is a summary of preliminary information gathered by the non-profit audit team (the "Audit Team"), which provided general guidance to the Franklin County Board of election before and during the post-election audit (the "Audit") conducted in Columbus between April 14 and April 22, 2008. It was prepared by Pam Smith of Verified Voting and Lawrence Norden of the Brennan Center, with input from Franklin County Board of Elections staff. In the coming weeks, the Audit Team expects to conduct additional data review and interviews, in order to present a more complete analysis of the Audit, and to provide recommendations for improving auditing practices in the future.

Date and time of random selection of precincts: April 14 and 15, 2008.

Method used for random selection of 7% of the vote total: Two selection methods were examined.

In one method, we (a) selected precincts at random from the total list of precincts in the County, using throws of three ten-sided dice. Once a number was thrown, (b) the figure was checked against the list of precinct numbers to determine if it was in the Congressional District for the contest we were selecting. If so, (c) the precinct number was written down so that the vote records could be retrieved from secure storage, and (d) the vote total for that contest was noted. [If the precinct was not in the correct District, it was skipped over and we would re-start at step a.] We continued the selection as in steps a-d, until the correct volume of votes needed for 7% of the total vote for that contest was reached. This method is entirely random; it is easy to do and is not time-consuming. There are occasional unused throws of the dice, but there was not an excessive number.

Second, we used the protocol defined in Directive 2008-39. We began by putting slips of paper into an opaque bowl where each slip of paper represented one of the political subdivisions in the County. A slip of paper was drawn from the bowl at random; we then used lists of alpha-numerically ordered precincts within the subdivisions to continue the protocol. When a precinct within the desired jurisdiction was selected, we noted the vote total for that precinct in that contest, and continued the process until the correct volume of votes was reached. By first breaking the list of precinct names down into Congressional Districts, selecting the next precinct was relatively easy. The random component of this protocol occurs within the first step; the remaining steps are sequential in nature and thus not random. In Franklin County, where the majority of the precincts are within Columbus, this method resulted in only a few Columbus precincts being selected.

Absentee and provisional ballots are counted in batches. To select ballots from this category for the manual audit, we drew bins of ballots at random from within the total number of bins. Each bin had a two-digit numerical value. We threw two ten-sided dice to select bins representing 7% of the total number of ballots in each category (absentee and provisional).

All of the approximately 800 optional paper polling place ballots were manually audited for the Presidential Primary contests also.

Was **random selection of precincts conducted after completion** of semi-final official canvass results? YES.

Dates and times of manual tally: April 14-April 21, 2008.

Ballot types: Franklin County uses iVotronic DREs with Real-Time-Audit-Log (RTAL) voter-verified paper audit trails, and optical scan ballots for absentees, provisionals and optional paper ballots in the polling places on Election Day, for those voters who preferred to vote on paper rather than on machine. Both ballot types, vvpap and optical scan, were tallied in the manual audit.

Ballot records examined:

Of the ballot records examined, whether RTAL or paper optical scan ballots, very few were cancelled. Eight ballot records were deemed illegible. On three RTAL rolls, a total of 8 illegible ballot records were noted; six on one and one each on two other rolls.

Discrepancies: No discrepancies in counts were found. With the exception of the eight (8) unreadable ballots noted above, the vote totals recorded on the summary report for the voting machines as the polls closed on Election Day fully matched the count by party and candidate on the manual review and tally from the RTAL paper tape. For those eight illegible votes a vote image log was generated from the flash memory to note the missing or unreadable votes.

Other records examined: Pollbook signatures were counted for each of the randomly selected precincts.

How many people were used for each manual tally team and the roles of each person (e.g., announcer, manager, observer, checker, tallier, etc.)? Teams of four persons were deployed – Caller, checker, tallier and observer. The caller and checker sat side by side so that each could see the RTAL record at the same time. One would scroll the RTAL roll using a winding device built in-house for that purpose by Franklin County elections personnel. The tallier and the observer sat side by side on the other side of the table. The person doing the tallying would mark the tally sheet for the appropriate candidate when called, as the observer would watch. Multiple teams were deployed: no fewer than three teams and up to ten teams over the course of audit period.

Approximately how many public observers were present during the manual tally on average? Not including the invited audit team, one observer came to watch the audit process. He stayed for most of one day and was present for the counting of both RTAL vvpap records and for the counting of absentee paper ballots.

Please describe the resources that were used to complete the manual tally (staff hours, material and facility costs, security costs)? 1613 staff hours to complete the tally of VVPAT ballots, 152 staff hours to complete the tally of optical scan ballots.